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DETERMINATIVE LAW
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INTRODUCTION
A reading of the Brief filed by the Department of Corrections
suggests that granting Mr. Neel fundamental rights in considering
whether he should remain incarcerated would bring the Department of
Corrections and the Utah Criminal Justice System to its knees. In
fact, the Appellee's Brief is a conceptual overreaction to the
simple and plain rights sought by Mr. Neel.
It is not the purpose of this Reply Brief to rebut every point
made by the Department of Corrections.

Instead, some general

themes of analysis emerge which show that the arguments made in the
Brief of Appellees are misplaced and Mr. Neel should be allowed a
fair parole proceeding in light of established constitutional
principles.
ARGUMENT
A. The Board of Pardons Fails
to Show That Due Process Does Not Attach
Mr. Neel argues in his principal Brief that under Utah's
indeterminate sentencing system the Board of Pardons actually
functions as the sentencing entity in a criminal proceeding.

The

State responds by stating, at page 10, that "appellant's bold
assertions are contrary to all published opinions from the state
and federal courts which have considered this specific issue under

1

Utah law." The State then follows with a lengthy citation of cases
without explanation of the holdings and facts.
A reading of all of the cases shows that none of them have
considered the specific issue. Instead, the cases may be generally
labeled as cases which deal with parole revocation proceedings.
None of them address constitutional considerations in light of an
indeterminate sentencing system.

In fact, some of the cases

support the proposition that due process rights exist in parole
proceedings and the analysis of the case is an effort to identify
exactly what rights exist.

See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of

Neb. Penal & Cor., 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Board of Pardons v. Allen.
482 U.S. 369 (1987).
A reading of the cases cited on pages 10 and 11 of the Brief
of Appellee shows that the federal courts hold there is no
federally protected liberty interest in an expectation of parole.
However, when the state creates an interest, as discussed in
Greenholtz, the liberty interest may be deprived only by applying
basic due process. Revocation hearings are, therefore, subject to
fundamental due process rights under the federal Constitution.
Morrissey v. Brewerf 408 U.S. 471 (1971).
A close review of the facts of this case shows that Mr. Neel
does not contest the general principles stated above, but that his
circumstances fall in a different legal framework for analysis.
Mr. Neel is not claiming in these proceedings that his parole was
improperly revoked.

What he claims is that he was, in effect,

2

sentenced under the Utah system without benefit of basic due
process rights.
The attempt of the Board of Pardons to dismiss its role in
sentencing as nothing more than an administrative proceeding not in
violation

of the separation

of powers doctrine

of the Utah

Constitution ignores the reality of what happens in the system.
When a convicted person in Utah has a sentence pronounced upon him
by the district court of five years to life, the accused has no
idea after the judge has spoken how much time will be spent in
prison.

If one assumes a normal life span of approximately

seventy-two years, the sentence is from five years to seventy-two
years.

The exact length of the sentence is not known until the

Utah Board of Pardons has considered the case and set a parole
date.
This system is to be distinguished from the system in which a
judge sets a definite term, such as ten years, and then a parole
board is given the authority to reduce the time based on a variety
of contingencies, including good behavior, evidence of rehabilitation, etc. A review of §77-27-3, contained in the Addendum, shows
that the Utah Board of Pardons "shall determine" when prisoners may
be released or their sentences "terminated". This broad discretion
makes the Board of Pardons the literal sentencing authority in Utah
despite their disclaimer to the contrary.
The responsive Brief of the Board of Pardons is, therefore,
directed to the wrong question. Neel agrees that the federal cases
say there is no protected

liberty interests for due process
3

consideration when what is at issue is a discretionary parole. The
Utah system does not fit these cases because of the indeterminate
sentencing scheme.

It is this difference that is specifically

recognized in Foote v. Utah Bd. of PardonsP 808 P.2d 734 (Utah
1991).

So long as it is actually sentencing that is being done by

the Board of Pardons, some due process rights attach as explained
in the principal Brief.

The Board of Pardons fails to present

convincing argument to the contrary.
B. The Due Process Rights
Claimed Do Not Unduly Burden the System
The Board of Pardons spends an inordinate amount of space in
its responsive Brief establishing that the federal courts have
consistently held that there is not a protected liberty interest to
which due process attaches in most parole proceedings. Again, Mr.
Neel does not dispute the existence of that analysis, but reminds
the court that what is at issue is a sentencing proceeding to
which, as explained in the principal Brief, due process rights
clearly attach.
Mr. Neel shows in his principal Brief that when the Utah
parole proceeding is properly labeled as a sentencing, certain
federal rights attach because they are outside of the cases relied
upon by the Board of Pardons. However, even if the analysis of the
Board of Pardons concerning federal due process rights is accepted,
a close reading of the responsive Brief shows that the existence of
due process rights under the Utah Constitution is acknowledged.
Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), discussed
4

in the principal Briefs of both parties, makes clear that rights
exist at least under the Utah Constitution and really ends the
discussion as to whether Mr. Neel has any rights.
discussion should be the scope of his rights.

Instead, the

It is that point

that the district court missed in this case.
The district court should have considered the facts of the
parole proceeding of Mr. Neel and considered evidence presented as
to the scope of rights as contemplated by Foote.

The attachments

to the Brief of the Board of Pardons in which they present
statistical analysis as to the burden of granting certain rights to
inmates do not belong in an appellate brief. These extrinsic facts
not in the record of this case are the kind of facts that should
have been presented in a district court hearing or trial when the
scope of due process applicable would be analyzed with the
interests balanced. By including the substantial factual information, including new proposed regulations, the State has, in effect,
presented its side of what the scope of due process rights ought to
be while arguing that Mr. Neel should not have the opportunity in
the correct context of the district court to present his legal
arguments as to the scope of due process.
Yet another fundamental flawed theme of the Brief of the Board
of Pardons is to further develop its resistance to the fundamental
rights of attorney representation, the holding of evidentiary
hearings, and access to the files of the Board of Pardons concerning Mr. Neel.

The opposing Brief responds in a broad and general

manner beyond that of the facts presented by Mr. Neel.
5

It is ironic that the State argues, at page 30, that the
current system promotes the "free flow of communication between the
offender and the Board" when it is Mr. Neel that asks in this
appeal that he be allowed to obtain information fundamental to the
decision of why he remains an inmate.
Similarly, at page 31, the Board of Pardons argues that Mr.
Neel has a right under the applicable regulations to support his
position "before, during and after the hearing". The problem with
that argument is that Mr. Neel is not told the basis of the
decision for him being denied parole so he has no way to effectively apply the right to rebut.
Finally, it is again ironic that the Board of Pardons resists
the involvement of attorneys in the parole proceedings because it
might bring delays to the Board consideration.

The irony arises

because Mr. Neel waited from February, 1991, when he had a
rehearing date, until July 26, 1991, for his rehearing because the
Department of Corrections was not able to complete an alienist
report on time.

See, Appellee's Brief, p. 7.

Delays likely will

be part of a revised system, but the degrese of the problem is
speculation against deprivation of a basic right.
The Board also resists application of the basic due process
principle

of confrontation

of adverse witnesses.

The Board

suggests that cross-examination of victims will be detrimental not
only to the victims but to the system as a whole*

This argument

ignores that Sixth Amendment confrontation can occur in far less
dramatic ways.

For example, in U.S. v. Reidr 911 F.2d 1456 (10th
6

Cir. 1990), a challenge was made to hearsay information considered
in connection with the federal sentencing guidelines.

The Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals held that cross-examination of adverse
information in sentencing is not necessarily required.

Instead,

the sentencing court can use adverse information provided that the
information is known to be reliable. The defendant, who has access
to the information, may then present information to rebut that to
be considered by the sentencing judge.
Similarly, in U.S. v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1990),
the court held that a defendant has a right in sentencing to
challenge facts contained in a presentence report. The court found
that the usual rules of evidence do not apply, but that the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment does apply and that the
defendant should have an opportunity to rebut material information
in dispute.
As with these federal decisions, Mr. Neel does not necessarily
need an opportunity to cross-examine the psychologist whose report
has led to the denial of his release.

The right of confrontation

under either the federal or state Constitutions can still be met by
simply making the psychological report available to him and giving
him an opportunity, whether through use of his own testimony or
information submitted to the Board by responding experts in his
behalf, to rebut.
A search of the principal Brief of Mr. Neel will show that he
does not ask for the same formalities required for a full-fledged
trial. Mr. Neel only asks that he be made aware of the information
7

which is being used to sentence him to a longer time in the prison,
that he be allowed to respond to the information in some way, and
that the presentation be made by an attorney of his choice.

As

explained in the principal Brief, these are the basic rights which
attach to any sentencing.
CONCLUSION
Despite the claimed parade of horrible things that will occur,
this court will see, upon reflection, that Mr. Neel really does not
ask for much. He was sentenced to an indeterminate time in prison
and given a parole date for which he was found to substantively
merit.

He breached his parole agreement and was rightfully

punished by revocation of the parole for the breach of that
agreement.

However, when he came to be considered for parole

again, he was told he was substantively not worthy of release. He
was given no explanation as to why the change had occurred in the
Board decision.

He does not dispute the power of the Board of

Pardons to ultimately retain him.

All he asks is that he be told

why the Board changed its position, be allowed to respond to the
reasons, and be allowed to make a presentation through an attorney.
Put another way, under Utah's indeterminate sentencing system,
he now sits in prison not knowing what he has done to be denied
release, not knowing what he has to do to earn release, and not
even knowing how long his sentence is except it may go as long as
his life.
Utah's Constitution guarantees in Article I, Section 1 that
all men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend
8

their liberty.

Mr. Neel does not have that right until he knows

why he is held and is allowed to respond to it. This court should
reverse the district court and order the Board of Pardons to hold
a

proceeding

which

allows

for the

confrontation

of

adverse

information and a response thereto by a qualified attorney.
DATED this

U<»

day of January, 1993.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.

GREGORY J*:^SANDERS, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
§77-27-3, U.C.A.,

Anno.

77-27-3. Duties of board — Decisions final — Governor's power —
Restitution as condition. (1) The board of pardons shall determine, by
majority decision, when and under what conditions, subject to the provisions of this chapter, persons now or hereafter serving sentences, in all
cases except treason or impeachments, or as otherwise limited by law, may
be released upon parole, pardoned, or have their fines or forfeitures
remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated. Nofineor forfeiture
shall be remitted, no parole, pardon or commutation granted or sentence
terminated, except after a full hearing before the board in open session
gnd after appropriate prior notice to the defendant of the time and place
of the hearing has been given. The orders and decisions of the board of
pardons and any dissent thereto shall be reduced to writing.
(2) The determinations and decisions of the board of pardons in cases
involving approval or denial of any action whatsoever, of paroles, pardons,
commutations or terminations of sentence, or remission of fines and forfeitures shall be final.
(3) Nothing herein shall be construed as a denial of or limitation on
the governor's power to grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convictions for offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on
impeachment; however, such respites or reprieves shall not extend beyond
the next session of the board of pardons and the board, at such session,
shall continue or determine such respite or reprieve, or it may commute
the punishment, or pardon the offense as herein provided. In the case of
conviction for treason, the governor has the power to suspend execution
of the sentence, until the case shall be reported to the legislature at its
next session, when the legislature shall either pardon or commute the sentence, or direct its execution.
In determining when and where and under what conditions persons now
or hereafter serving sentences may be released upon parole, pardoned or
have their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or
terminated, the state board of pardons shall consider whether such persons
have made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with the standards and procedures of section 76-3-201, as a condition
of any parole, pardon, remission offinesor forfeitures, commutation or termination of sentence.
If the state board of pardons determines that restitution is inappropriate, the state board of pardons shall state in writing as a part of the record
of proceedings, the reasons for the decision.
(4) Whenever the state board of pardons orders the release on parole
of an inmate who has been sentenced to make restitution pursuant to section 76-3-201, but with respect to whom payment of all or a portion of the
restitution was suspended until his release from imprisonment, the board
may establish a schedule by which payment of the restitution may be
resumed. In fixing the schedule and supervising the paroled inmate's performance thereunder the board may consider the factors specified in section 76-3-201 (3). The board may provide to the sentencing court a copy
of the schedule and any modifications thereof.

ADDENDUM B
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 1

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to eiyoy and defend their
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
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